We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [2] showed that even with only one seller and one buyer, no Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC), Individually Rational (IR), and Budget-Balanced (BB) mechanism can achieve full GFT (trade whenever buyer's value is higher than the seller's cost). The same paper also proposed the "second-best" mechanism that maximizes the GFT subject to BIC, IR, and BB constraints, which is unfortunately rather complex for even the single-seller single-buyer case. Our mechanism is simple, BIC, IR, and BB and achieves 1/2 of the optimal GFT among all BIC, IR, and BB mechanisms. The result holds for arbitrary distributions of the buyers' and sellers' values and can accommodate any downward-closed feasibility constraints over the allocations. The analysis of our mechanism is facilitated by extending the Cai-Weinberg-Devanur duality framework [1] to two-sided markets.
A classical impossibility result [2] states that even in bilateral trading there is no Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC), Individual Rational (IR), and Budget Balance (BB) (if the mechanism does not gain or lose any money from the market) mechanism that achieves full GFT. They also provided a mechanism that maximizes the GFT among all BIC, IR, and BB mechanisms. However, such a "second-best" mechanism has extremely complex allocation and price rules determined by solving a system of differential equations that depend on the buyer's and seller's distributions. It is difficult to imagine how to implement it in practice.
Our Results and Contributions: In this paper, we provide simple mechanisms to approximate the optimal GFT obtainable by any BIC, IR, and BB mechanisms. Prior work has either focused on approximating a different objective -the social welfare or has made assumptions on the value distributions of the agents. Here we list the three major contributions of our paper.
(1) We provide a simple BIC, IR, and BB mechanism that achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal GFT in bilateral trading for arbitrary seller and buyer value distributions.
(2) We extend the 2-approximation to the double auction setting with arbitrary downwardclosed feasibility constraints and arbitrary value distributions for the sellers and buyers.
(3) We demonstrate the applicability of the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework for two-sided markets. Although our results only concern single-dimensional settings, our duality based upper bound applies to multi-dimensional settings as well.
In particular, for the bilateral trading setting, we consider the following two simple BIC, IR, BB mechanisms and show that the better of the two achieves 1/2 of the optimal GFT.
Seller-Offering Mechanism(SOM): The seller offers a price for the item to the buyer. The buyer receives the item if she pays the offered price to the seller. Otherwise, the seller keeps the item and no payment is transferred. The seller chooses the price that maximizes her expected utility depending on her true value s and the distribution of the buyer's value D B .
Buyer-Offering Mechanism(BOM): The buyer offers a price for the item to the seller. If the seller accepts the offered price, the buyer receives the item and pays the seller the offered price. Otherwise, the seller keeps the item and no payment is transferred. The buyer chooses the price that maximizes her expected utility depending on her true value b and the distribution of the seller's value D S .
Our result can be generalized to a broader setting known as the double auction, in which there is a single type of item on the market. Each buyer wants a single copy of the item and each seller owns a single copy of it. Assume buyers' and sellers' values are all drawn independently from possibly different distributions. Moreover, we allow any downward-closed feasibility constraint on which buyer-seller pairs can trade. We show that for any double auction with arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint, the better of two simple BIC, IR, BB mechanisms, which are natural generalizations of SOM and BOM, achieves 1/2 of the optimal GFT.
Our Techniques: Our result is facilitated by applying the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to two-sided markets. We first characterize the set of dual variables that has finite dual objective values as flows. By choosing a specific set of dual variables, we derive an upper bound for the optimal GFT achievable by any BIC, IR, and BB mechanism. Interestingly, the upper bound has a natural format and suggests the allocation rule of our simple mechanisms.
